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Introduction
A traditional function of the central bank is to
control the price level. This function is a natural
implication of economic theory: The celebrated
quantity theory of money can be summarized
in Milton Friedman’s dictum that “inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phenome-
non.” As reviewed in Robert Lucas’ Nobel lecture
(1996), there is a wealth of empirical evidence
linking price movements to movements in the
money stock.
This traditional analysis has been challenged
by the fiscal theory of the price level (FT), which
maintains that the price level is determined by
the budgetary policies of the fiscal authority.
This attack on the conventional position has
come in two parts, weak-form FT and strong-
form FT.
Weak-form FT begins with an obvious link
between monetary and fiscal policy. Since
seignorage (revenue from money creation) is 
a possible revenue source, long-run monetary
and fiscal policy are jointly determined by fiscal
budget constraints. Whether monetary or fiscal
policy determines prices involves an assump-
tion about which policymaker will move first,
the central bank or the fiscal authority. Weak-
form FT assumes that the fiscal authority moves
first by committing to a path for primary budget
surpluses/deficits, forcing the monetary author-
ity to generate the seignorage needed to main-
tain solvency. Sargent (1986) describes this as a
“game of chicken.”
If both the monetary and the fiscal authority
refuse to generate the needed seignorage, then
the nation’s debt-to-GDP ratio will grow at an
unsustainable rate. This implies ever-increasing
real rates of interest on government debt, as the
market demands larger and larger default pre-
miums. This process cannot continue: One of
the two players, the fiscal authority or the cen-
tral bank, must alter its behavior. Weak-form FT
assumes the central bank will respond and gen-
erate the seignorage needed to avoid default.
Using the game-of-chicken analogy, weak-form
FT assumes that the monetary authority loses
and is forced to “blink.”
This version of the fiscal theory predicts that
fiscal policy determines future inflation as well.
Although this is true, it does so only by deter-
mining future money growth. The traditional
version of the FT, therefore, is not at odds with
the quantity theory, in the sense that prices are
still driven by current or future money growth.
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Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) celebrated ex-
ample, in which tight money today increases
the price level, occurs because future money
growth—and hence future inflation—increases.
The theory simply posits that the ultimate driver
of the money supply is the fiscal authority. In
other words, fiscal policy is exogenous, while
money supply movements are endogenous.
More recently, a stronger version of the 
fiscal theory has been posited. Strong-form FT
maintains that fiscal policy determines future
inflation, but independent of future money
growth. Unlike the weak theory, where inflation
is still (ultimately) a monetary phenomenon,
strong-form FT maintains that fiscal policy
affects the price level and the path of inflation
independent of monetary policy changes.
This new version of the fiscal theory is
possible because, in a wide variety of mone-
tary models, the initial price level is not pinned
down; different initial price levels are consistent
with different paths for future inflation. In
contrast, prices are uniquely determined in the
weak form of the FT analyzed by Sargent and
Wallace. Strong-form FT assumes that the fiscal
budget constraint, and thus fiscal policy, pins
down the initial price level. Without this con-
straint, the initial price level may be indetermi-
nate, even if the money supply is given exoge-
nously—that is, even if the monetary authority
moves first by committing to a path for the
money stock. This is in sharp contrast with
weak-form FT, in which the money supply is
endogenous in order to satisfy the govern-
ment’s budget constraint. Strong-form FT
assumes that both fiscal and monetary policy
are given exogenously and that prices adjust
to ensure solvency. In this game of chicken,
neither player blinks.
This article begins with a discussion of weak-
form FT by reviewing basic budgetary arithmetic
and its implications for monetary policy. In par-
ticular, the “unpleasant arithmetic” of Sargent
and Wallace (1981) is presented. This paper is a
natural place to begin, as it provides a powerful
demonstration of the restrictions that the gov-
ernment budget may place on monetary policy.
Section I analyzes a partial-equilibrium model
where real cash balances immediately jump to
their steady state—that is, equilibria in which
the level of real cash balances remains constant.
Section II broadens the analysis to a more fully
specified general-equilibrium model, allowing
for consideration of equilibria where the level of
real balances varies with time and for considera-
tion of strong-form FT. Section III extends the
discussion to models in which the central bank
targets the interest rate and in which the money
supply is endogenous, asking whether this case
is an example of weak- or strong-form FT. Sec-
tion IV presents our conclusions.
I. Weak-Form FT: 
A Partial-Equilibrium
Analysis
This section will present some basic results of
the budgetary linkages between monetary and
fiscal policy. For illustrative purposes, we as-
sume that the real rate of interest (denoted by r)
and the real level of output (normalized to
one) are constant. We also assume a form for
money demand instead of deducing it from a
more completely specified environment. 
These partial-equilibrium simplifications limit
our discussion to steady-state equilibria, where
real cash balances immediately jump to their
steady-state (constant) level and remain there
forever. Since money growth is equal to the
inflation rate in such an equilibrium, this partial-
equilibrium model can give rise only to weak-
form FT. In later sections we extend this analy-
sis to a general-equilibrium model, where this
is not necessarily true, so that either weak- or
strong-form FT can arise. 
Equilibrium is defined by two conditions, fis-
cal budgetary balance and money-market equi-
librium. Money-market equilibrium (real money
supply = real money demand) is defined by 
(1) M0/P0 = f (R),
where money demand (f ) is a function of the
nominal interest rate (R = r + π) and π is the
inflation rate. Money demand is a function of
inflation only because the real interest rate and
output are both assumed to be constant. M0 is
the nominal money stock during the first period
of the model, and P0 is the corresponding nom-
inal price level.
Fiscal budget balance is given by
(2) D + S(π) = B0 /P0,
where S(π) (S′(π) > 0) denotes the present
value of seignorage, and D is the present value
of future primary budget surpluses (negative
values represent deficits). Annual real seignor-
age from a constant money growth rate of g
(and thus a constant inflation rate of π = g) is 
πf (R). The present discounted value of
seignorage then, is S =πf (π)/r. The accumu-
lated real value of government debt due at time
zero, denoted by B0/P0, must equal the present
value of future primary budget surpluses plus
revenues from seignorage.
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Total government liabilities are defined as
the sum of money (the liability of the central
bank) and government bonds (the liability of
the Treasury). We assume that the initial level
of total government liabilities, H = M0+B0, is
fixed. The ratio M0/H is the fraction of total lia-
bilities that are monetary. This fraction changes
via open-market operations by swapping (new-
ly printed) money, M0, for government debt,
B0, holding H fixed. Rewriting equation (2) by
substituting out B0 gives




Notice that there are two forms of seignor-
age in this model. One comes from future
money growth, S(π). The other comes from
movements in the current money stock, M0/P0.
Open-market purchases swap B0 for M0 and
thus lower the nominal (and real) value of gov-
ernment debt.
Solving for P in equation (1) and substituting
into equation (3), we have
(4) S(π) + D =  
(H – M0)
f (R).
Assuming that S is increasing (that is, we are
on the “correct” side of the Laffer curve) and f
is decreasing (money demand slopes down),
then for a given D and H/M0, there is at most
one inflation rate (future money growth), π,
that satisfies equation (4).
To close the model, we must define mone-
tary and fiscal policy. A policy is defined by
choosing two of the following variables: π, D,
or H/M0. The third variable is determined
endogenously to satisfy equation (4). 
Weak-form FT assumes fiscal dominance,
which is defined in the following way: The fis-
cal authority commits to D, thus forcing the
central bank to choose either current (initial)
M0 or future inflation, π, to satisfy equation (4).
The central bank can react to a change in fiscal
policy by changing either M0 or π. 
If future inflation is held constant, a decrease
in D (that is, an increase in the deficit) necessi-
tates increasing the current money stock, M0
(and hence P0), lowering the real value of gov-
ernment debt outstanding. If money is held
constant, then the monetary authority must
react by increasing future inflation. A decrease
in D must result in either a one-time increase in
money, M0, and hence P0 (a one-time jump in
inflation), or an increase in future (sustained)
inflation, π. We define fiscal dominance as
weak-form FT because the price level is still
determined by current or future money supply
movements. The central bank, however, is
driven by the fiscal authority. In terms of the
game of chicken, the central bank is forced to
blink; that is, the money supply is dictated by
fiscal policy and is, therefore, endogenous.
Fiscal dominance is the assumption made
by Sargent and Wallace (1981) in their classic
paper, “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic.”
They assume that “the path of [primary sur-
pluses, D] is given and does not depend on
current or future monetary policies. This as-
sumption is …about the behavior of the mone-
tary and fiscal authorities and the ‘game’ that
they are playing. Since the monetary authorities
affect the extent to which seignorage is ex-
ploited as a revenue source, monetary and fis-
cal policies have to be coordinated. The ques-
tion is which authority ‘moves first’ … who
imposes discipline on whom?”1
The arithmetic implied by this game of
chicken is unpleasant. Tight money today (a
low M0 and more debt, B0) necessitates loose
money (a high π) in the future to pay off the
debt. Equivalently, low seignorage today (low
M0) implies high seignorage (high π) tomorrow.
An even more unpleasant possibility of weak-
form FT is that tight money today could in-
crease today’s price level. This would occur if
money demand were significantly elastic, as
higher inflation and, in turn, a higher nominal
interest rate lowered real money demand and
increased the price level. Solving equation (3)
for P0 yields
P0 = S(π) + f(R) + D .
The effect of an increase in future inflation on
current prices, dP0/dπ, depends on the relative
magnitude of decreased nominal money (thus
lowering prices) versus the decline in real
money caused by higher future inflation. Using
the fact that S = πf(R)/r and R = r +π, we have
(5) P0 = Rf(R) + rD 
and 
dP0 = (η – 1)P0
M0 ,
dπ rH
where η = –Rf ′(R)/f is the interest elasticity of
money demand.
Notice that dP0/dπ has the same sign as 
(η –1). If money demand is sufficiently elastic
(greater than one), then low money supply
P0 P0
M0
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(M0) today (implying a high level of inflation
tomorrow) implies a high price level (P0) today.
The intuition is as follows: Low M0 tends to
lower P0. But the resulting higher inflation, π,
tends to lower real money demand, driving P0
upward. This second effect overwhelms the
first, if and only if the interest rate elasticity of
money demand is greater than unity. Empirical
estimates of η, however, are uniformly less than
one. Thus Sargent and Wallace’s unpleasant
possibility that tight money leads to higher cur-
rent prices (a low M0 leads to a high P0) is
probably only a theoretical curiosity.
The polar opposite of the assumption of fis-
cal dominance is the assumption of monetary
dominance. In this case, the central bank com-
mits to π and H/M0. The fiscal authority must
then choose D to satisfy equation (4)—that is,
the fiscal authority is assumed to blink. Since
the central bank chooses π and H/M0, it also
determines P0. Monetary dominance is the typ-
ical assumption in most theoretical monetary
models and is not an example of the FT. For
example, a standard simplifying assumption in
many monetary models is that B0 = 0, implying
that D is endogenous and given by S (π) = –D.
In this game of chicken, the monetary author-
ity moves first and the fiscal authority blinks.
II. A General-
Equilibrium Model
In this section, we examine the more general
case in which the level of real cash balances is
not necessarily at the steady state. Here we ask,
is it possible for neither the monetary nor the
fiscal authority to blink? We refer to this case as
strong-form FT because movements in inflation
do not result from money growth. 
To explore this possibility, we consider the
simple case where money supply growth is
constant. This is an example of monetary domi-
nance in the sense that the central bank moves
first. In the previous section, this implied that
fiscal policy would be endogenous and dictated
by the government budget constraint. Is this
still the case? Looking at fixed-money-growth
equilibria is useful, since changes in inflation
will, by definition, not be driven by money
supply changes. To explore these possibilities
we require a dynamic (general equilibrium)
counterpart to the money-demand equation (1). 
The economy consists of infinitely lived
households with preferences over consumption
and real balances given by
  βtU(ct, Mt/P t),
where β is a constant rate of time discount and
ct and Mt/P t denote consumption and real
money balances, respectively. This money-
in-the-utility-function framework is quite gen-
eral and stands as a proxy for the transactions-
facilitation role of money.
We assume that preferences are separable
and given by
U(ct,mt)≡V (ct) + 
mt
1 – ε 
.
1 – ε
The (absolute value of the) interest elasticity 
of the implied money-demand curve is equal
to η = 1/ε. This assumption of separability is
not as odd as it may seem. In a model with
endogenous production, Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1999) demonstrate that the model behaves as
if utility were separable in consumption and
real balances.
The household’s intertemporal budget con-
straint is given by
Mt +1= Mt + Xt + Bt – 1(1 + Rt –1) 
– Bt – P tct + P t yt ,
where Mt denotes money balances at the 
beginning of time t; Xt denotes a monetary
transfer from the government (inclusive of
lump-sum tax payments); Bt –1denotes bond-
holdings acquired in period t –1;  Rt – 1 denotes
the nominal interest rate from t –1 to t; and the
endowment is normalized such that v (y)= 1 .
As preferences are separable, the constant level
of income implies that the real rate of interest is
constant at r = (1/β ) – 1. Notice that the bond
choice at time t,Bt, determines the amount of
cash the household has available for the next
period’s purchases (Mt +1).
The Euler equations that define equilibrium
are given by
(6) Uc(t)/Pt = (1 +Rt)β Uc (t +1)/Pt +1
and
(7) Uc(t) 
= β   
Uc (t +1) + Um (t +1) .
Pt Pt +1
Equation (6) arises from optimal bond choice
and is the standard Fisherian decomposition of
the nominal interest rate into the real interest
rate and an inflation premium 
[(1 + R) = (1 + π)(1 + r), or (R   r + π)]. Equa-
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balances (Mt +1). Holding on to one dollar today
comes at the loss of current consumption (the
LHS of equation [7]), but provides for consump-
tion and transaction services next period (the
RHS of equation [7]). Combining equations (6)
and (7) yields a demand-for-money equation:
(8) Um(t +1)/Uc(t + 1) = Rt.
By inverting equation (8) to express m as a
function of R, we have the dynamic counterpart
of equation (1). Money demand in t + 1 is a
function of the interest rate between t and t +1.
To focus on strong-form FT, suppose that
the central bank fixes the current money stock
at M0 and the gross money supply growth rate
at G   1. In fixing the monetary rule in this
way, we are assuming monetary dominance,
in that money growth is exogenous and will
not be deviated from for fiscal reasons. The 
key question now becomes: Is the path of the
price level determined by this exogenous mon-
etary policy? If not, then we have a case of
strong-form FT.
Replacing Rt as defined by equation (6) in
equation (8) implies that money-market equi-
librium is given by
(9)   m1–ε
t +1+ mt +1= (G/β)mt,
where mt = Mt /P t.2 Our analysis will examine
numerous real balance paths that satisfy equa-
tion (9) but are economically meaningful in that
real balances remain positive. A steady-state
solution is one in which mt = m*   0 for all t.
There is one positive steady state given by 





From equation (9) it is clear that if ε   1,
there is also another steady state in which 
mt = 0 for all t. This is an equilibrium in which
money is not valued. In contrast, if ε   1, then
equation (10) describes the only non-negative
(and thus permissible) steady state. Therefore,
we have two cases.
Case 1, ε   1
This section examines the case where ε   1.
Equation (8) implies that the interest elasticity
of money demand (η = 1/ε) is less than one. 
In this case, we will show that the general-
equilibrium model collapses down to the 
partial-equilibrium model of the previous sec-
tion, and thus cannot deliver strong-form FT;
equivalently, the assumption of monetary dom-
inance (constant money growth) implies that
the fiscal authority must be passive.
Figure 1 graphs mt + 1 as a function of 
mt [mt + 1 = g(mt)] to illustrate these dynamics. 
The arrows indicate how mt evolves over time.
Since there is a unique positive steady state, m*,
paths that begin below m* (say m a) imply that
real balances become complex-valued in finite
time and are thus nonsensical.3 Real money
balances starting to the right (say mb) explode,
eventually violating the transversality condition
and thus do not satisfy the necessary conditions
for an optimum (see appendix A). Hence, as
long as money demand is not too elastic 
(η=1/ε  1), the current price level is uniquely
determined and real balances must jump imme-
diately to the steady state m*.4 Thus, since
monetary policy was given (fixed G and M0), 
  2 =   – 1 =  – 1. mt  + 1





Dynamics of Real Money 
Balances: ε   1
mt +  1
mt + 1 = g (mt )
mt + 1 = mt 
mL ma m* mb mt
SOURCE: Authors.
  3 There are no real solutions to (9) when money balances are to
the left of mLon the graph.  The solutions are then all complex which have
no economic meaning.  This occurs irrespective of whether you take the
upper or lower part of the “C” in figure 1. We thank Larry Christiano and
Terry Fitzgerald for pointing out an error in the earlier working paper ver-
sion of this figure.
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it is dominant, and fiscal policy must adjust to
ensure budgetary solvency (equation [2]). This
general-equilibrium example is thus identical to
the steady-state example of monetary domi-
nance in the previous section.  
Case 2, ε   1: 
Strong-Form FT
Suppose instead that ε   1, so that money-
demand elasticity is greater than one (η   1).
In this case there are two steady-state solutions
(equation [10] and m* = 0).
Notice that the only stationary equilibrium
with valued money is that in which real bal-
ances (and prices) immediately jump to the
positive steady state, m*. If we restrict the
analysis to stationary equilibria, because M0 is
given exogenously the fiscal authority must
move to maintain fiscal solvency. This once
again corresponds exactly to the monetary
dominance results in the previous section.
While one can argue that nonstationary equi-
libria can be ruled out on empirical grounds,
there is nothing in the model (if η   1) to rule
out these nonstationary paths. Figure 2 illus-
trates the model’s dynamics.5  Unless current
real-money balances are given by m* (that is,
M0/P *), real balances will either explode or
implode over time. To the right of m*, all paths
have real balances exploding as the price level
approaches zero (self-fulfilling hyperdeflations).
As before, these paths are not equilibria because
they violate the household’s transversality condi-
tion (see appendix A). To the left of m*, all
paths are self-fulfilling hyperinflations: The real
value of the money stock goes to zero in the
limit. These equilibria cannot be ruled out a pri-
ori, since they also converge to a steady state in
which money is not valued. Thus, there is an
infinite number of equilibria, each indexed by
the current price level, P0. Any initial price level
P0   P * is an equilibrium. 
Returning to our game-of-chicken analogy,
we ask the simple question of whether anyone
has to blink. As we showed in section I, if the
fiscal authority commits to a primary surplus
path and the monetary authority commits to a
seignorage path (that is, if both agents refuse
to blink), then the fiscal solvency condition
will be violated. Someone has to move. How-
ever, this is not necessarily true in the general
equilibrium case, since (with ε   1) there exist
non-steady-state equilibria in which the current
price level is free. If both parties refuse to
move, then the initial price level will immedi-
ately jump to a level satisfying the govern-
ment’s budget constraint.
To see the effect of fiscal policy on the price
path, consider the case where there is no
money growth (G =1). With no future seignor-
age revenues, equation (2) gives P0 = B0/D.
Thus, fiscal policy determines the current price
level and (from equation [9]) the path of prices.
A higher D implies a lower P0, and vice versa.
Despite the exogeneity of monetary policy, fis-
cal policy maintains a great deal of autonomy,
restrained only by the requirement that 
m   m*, so that D   (B0/M0)• m*. If D
exceeded this latter value, there would be no
equilibrium if both parties refused to move.
Referring to figure 2, the nonstationary equi-
librium paths (where m   m*) have prices ris-
ing and inflation increasing. Since the money-
demand relationship still holds, the only way
for current prices to rise is for the nominal
interest rate and inflation to increase (remem-
FIGURE 2
Dynamics of Real Money 
Balances:  ε   1
mt +  1
mt + 1 = mt 
g(mt )
mt  m* mhigh mlow
SOURCE: Authors.
  4 In a private communication, Larry Christiano and Terry Fitzgerald
note that if εis sufficiently large (money demand is sufficiently interest
inelastic), then the C-shape in figure 1 is shifted up so that the lower branch
cuts the 45-degree line from above (this arises if ε> G/(G–β)).  In this
case, both branches of the g-mapping are relevant so that for a given mt
there is more than one possible mt+1. The strong-form FT will be of no
help in eliminating this type of multiplicity.  As for empirical relevance, for 
β= 0.99, and G= 1.02, these pathologies arise only if ε> 34, an interest
elasticity less than  0.029!
  5 This case is examined in McCallum (1998).
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ber that money growth is constant). A change
in fiscal policy (D) changes current prices by
changing the path of future inflation. For exam-
ple, an increase in the present discounted value
of future surpluses (D) lowers current prices
and future inflation.
This is a version of strong-form FT; fiscal pol-
icy affects the price path even though it has no
effect on current or future money growth (nor
on real output or the real rate of interest, both
of which are assumed to be constant). This
strong-form FT occurs because both monetary
and fiscal policy are acting in a dominant fash-
ion; in other words, neither party blinks. This is
an intriguing possibility—namely, that fiscal
policy can influence the price-level path inde-
pendent of movements in the money stock. But
the analysis has two peculiar but interrelated
characteristics. First, the model exhibits self-
fulfilling hyperinflations. Although this is an
interesting theoretical possibility, there is scant
empirical evidence for such phenomena.6  Sec-
ond, these hyperinflationary paths and the pos-
sibility of strong-form FT assume an implausibly
high interest elasticity (η = 1/ε   1). We know




These peculiarities are not robust. For example,
following Matsuyama (1990, 1991), suppose 
we relax the separability assumption on prefer-
ences.7  In this case, it is possible to get the
strong-form FT without an implausibly high
interest elasticity of money demand and with-
out nonstationary (exploding) price paths. The
nonseparable counterpart to equation (9) is
(11) G
β mtUc(mt) = mt +1[Uc(mt +1)+Um(mt +1)].
Since consumption is assumed, constant mar-
ginal utility is expressed as a function of real
cash balances only. 
As before, there exists a unique positive
steady state. But unlike figure 1, which shows
that the economy would immediately jump to
this steady state, prices in this example will 
not necessarily immediately jump to P*. A suffi-
cient condition for this to occur—that is, for
the existence of multiple stationary equilibria—
is that the mapping of mt +1= g(mt ) cross the
45-degree line from above, or 0   g′(mss)   1.
Figure 3 shows such a case. The analysis
resembles the earlier example where ε   1 
(figure 2), except that all initial real balances
starting away from the steady state converge to
m* and thus do not have the counterfactual
implication that prices will explode over time.
Before, real balances beginning to the left of
m* converged to another steady state where
money had no value.
Unlike this earlier nonstationary example,
there are no restrictions on the initial stock of
real money: Because these stationary paths
converge to the steady state, the transversality
condition is never violated. What is the initial
level of real balances? On a theoretical level, it
is the level of real money chosen at the begin-
ning of time; however, the initial price level is
chosen every period. If initial real balances are
not determined at the beginning of time, then
real balances every period are also undeter-
mined. This leads to what economists call
  6 At a theoretical level, these hyperinflationary equilibria could be
ruled out by a government promise to guarantee a lower bound on the real
value of the currency by backing it with an arbitrarily small (but positive) real
asset. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) make this point.
  7 In addition to considering nonseparability, Matsuyama (1990,
1991) uses a different timing convention. In the model of this article,
beginning-of-period cash balances enter into the current-utility functional.
In contrast, Matsuyama assumes that end-of-period balances enter into the
current-utility functional. See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) for a discussion
of these issues.
FIGURE 3
Possible Dynamics of Real 
Money Balances with 
Nonseparable Preferences
mt +  1
mt + 1 = mt 
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sunspot equilibria, in that purely extraneous
information leads to a shift in public beliefs and
thus affects the model’s equilibrium. The hall-
mark of sunspot equilibria is the presence of
self-fulfilling behavior.
Returning to the details of the nonseparable
case, appendix B shows that equation (11) looks
like figure 3 [0   g′(mss)   1] if and only if
(12)  Uc
mUcm   –1,
where this ratio is evaluated at the unique posi-
tive steady state. This is the ratio of elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption to the level
of real balances. 
To understand why sunspot equilibria (or
self-fulfilling prophecies) are present in this
economy under condition (12), let us walk
through a simple example. Suppose there is a
“sunspot event” at time t (an event independent
of market fundamentals) that leads households
to increase their holdings of real cash balances
by 1 percent (Pt falls by 1 percent). For this sun-
spot movement to be stationary, the economy
must move back toward the steady state: 
mt   mt + 1   mss. For mt + 1   mss, the nominal
rate at time t must be below the steady state
(recall equation [8]). For real balances to deterio-
rate between t and t + 1 (mt  mt + 1), however,
the inflation rate must be above the steady state.
But how can the nominal rate be below the
steady state, while the inflation rate is above
the steady state? If and only if the real rate of
interest is sufficiently below the steady state.
The logic is as follows: Because the real inter-
est rate (r) is the ratio of the marginal utility of
consumption today divided by the marginal
utility of consumption tomorrow, r falls by
more than the increase in expected inflation;
thus, the increase in real money balances sig-
nificantly decreases the marginal utility of con-
sumption today. This is exactly the restriction
in equation (12).
As in the previous section, the only way to
escape this indeterminacy is for both the mone-
tary and fiscal authorities to be completely un-
concerned with balancing the government’s
books, in which case the strong-form FT 
provides the additional restriction needed to
uniquely determine equilibrium. By pinning
down initial real balances, it essentially elimi-
nates the possibility of sunspot equilibria. Now
the only “sunspots” that can change current
prices and future inflation are changes in the
primary budget surplus, D.8
This stationary example, however, makes
two unusual assumptions. First, the elasticity in
equation (12) is negative—additional cash bal-
ances lower the marginal utility of consump-
tion. Second, this response (in absolute value)
is quite large, greater than one. Both of these
assumptions are problematic, especially given
the results of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) that
in a production economy with elastic labor, the
model economy acts as if Ucm = 0.9
These examples assume that money growth
is constant. In this case, it is hard to obtain
price-level indeterminacy. What about other
monetary rules? For instance, it has long been
recognized that interest rate targeting leaves the
initial value of nominal money (and prices) free.
Section III demonstrates this and asks whether
this is still an example of strong-form FT.
III. Endogenous
Money: The 
Case of a Fixed
Interest Rate
Most central banks conduct policy by way of
directives for the nominal rate of interest. Such 
a policy implies that the money supply and
seignorage are endogenous, opening up some
interesting possibilities for the fiscal theory of
the price level. By committing to an interest rate
peg regardless of fiscal concerns, the central
bank is acting in what seems to be a dominant
fashion. But since the money supply and seig-
norage are endogenous, the monetary authority
moves last and the fiscal authority maintains a
great deal of discretion. On the surface, it is un-
clear whether monetary policy is acting in a
dominant fashion.
If we return to the game-of-chicken analogy,
then in the case of an interest rate target there
is another player in the game—the general
public. Under such a monetary policy, the cen-
tral bank agrees to engage in open-market op-
erations to maintain the targeted rate, that is,
buy and sell bonds at the request of the public.
Thus, the public becomes an important player
in the game. So the critical question is, who
constrains whom? Does the fiscal authority con-
  8 The path of future surpluses (D) may not be completely free. There
may be levels of D for which there is no initial price level and no subse-
quent path of prices that satisfy the fiscal budget contraint. D is not actually
a sunspot since it is a market fundamental.
  9 There is another example where a constant-money-growth rule
may lead to stationary indeterminacy: If the relative coefficient of risk aver-
sion is greater than two (not implausible), then a cash-in-advance (CIA)
economy with production implies indeterminacy. (See Carlstrom and Fuerst
[1999].) This example suffers because it is extremely sensitive to the CIA
assumption and does not arise in a money-in-the-utility-function frame-
work, as assumed above.
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strain the behavior of the general public? Or
does the general public constrain the behavior
of the fiscal authority?
This section explores these issues first in the
steady-state model of section I, and then in the
general-equilibrium model of section II. For
simplicity, we will restrict the analysis to a fixed
interest rate target (an interest rate peg).
The Steady-
State Model
In the steady-state model, the central bank
maintains a constant nominal interest rate by
picking π, but then allows M0 to be endoge-
nous. The pegged nominal rate determines the
level of real balances in equation (1). Combin-
ing equations (1) and (3), we have
(13) S(π) + D + f (R ) = P0
H.
Given that the real rate is fixed, a nominal
interest rate peg also determines the inflation
rate, π. What, then, determines the price level?
One can think of the monetary authority
choosing M, the fiscal authority choosing D, and
the public choosing real balances and, hence, P.
By the definition of an interest rate peg, the
central bank moves last since they chose money
(endogenously) to ensure that the interest rate
remains constant. Given this assumption, there
are two cases to consider: the fiscal authority
moves first, or the public moves first.
If the fiscal authority moves first, then D is
exogenous. Since π  and H are also given, equa-
tion (13) determines P0 as a function of D: a
low D implies a high P0, and vice versa. Since
M0/P0 is already determined by equation (3), we
can also think of P0 as a function of M0. Return-
ing to the game-of-chicken analogy, the general
public blinks. Woodford (1994) uses this as-
sumption to eliminate the price-level indetermi-
nacy of operating under an interest rate peg.
Notice that the situation resembles weak-form
FT since fiscal policy, D, affects prices because
it also affects the money supply, M0.
If the public chooses first, then the fiscal
authority must adjust D to satisfy fiscal balance
—that is, the fiscal authority blinks. In this case,
movements in the public’s behavior (different
choices for P0 and M0) translate directly into
price movements. This creates self-fulfilling
behavior, or sunspot equilibria: If the public
expects a high price level and demands a high
level of money balances to satisfy their transac-
tions needs, then the money supply rises and
generates the high price level they anticipate.
This set of assumptions produces the standard
nominal indeterminacy of operating under an
interest rate peg: The current money stock (M0)
is free and so is the current price level (P0).
A General-
Equilibrium Model
Now let us consider the effect of an interest
rate peg on the general-equilibrium model.
With a constant level of consumption, the
Fisher equation (6) implies that this corre-
sponds to targeting the inflation rate at some
rate π. The counterpart to equation (9) is 
(14) m– ε
t + 1 = {[(1 +π)/β] – 1}.
Figure 4 graphs mt + 1 as a function of mt, 
a special case of figure 3. Here the initial m is
free, but the economy immediately jumps to
the steady state given in equation (10).10
FIGURE 4
Dynamics of Real Money Balances
with an Interest Rate Peg
mt +  1
mt + 1 = mt 
mlow m* mhigh mt
g(mt )
SOURCE: Authors.
  10 To illustrate how the non-uniqueness of the initial price level
leads to sunspot equilibria, note that with uncertainty, equation (13)
becomes Et(mt+ 1
–ε ) = {[(1 + π)/β] – 1}. A quadratic approximation implies
that real money balances will be given by mt= m* + vt. There are no restric-
tions on the shock term vt which, in principle, can be governed by sunspots.
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Let us refer to this initial period as period 0.
From equation (13), using the definitions of 
H and f (R), the fiscal solvency constraint is
given by
(15)
M1 – M0 + 
S(π)
+ D = 
B0
P0          1 + rP 0
(remember that because the real rate is con-
stant, inflation is also constant).
Since the first bond market does not open
until the end of period 0, M0 and B0 (since 
M0 + B0 =H ) are given by history. As for M1, 
we have that M1 = f (π)P1 = f (π)(1 + π)P0. There
are only two free variables in equation (15), D
and M1. 
The situation is symmetric with the steady-
state model.11  The public chooses M1 in the
bond market at the end of period 0. The central
bank agrees to exchange money for bonds at
the rate desired by the public. We have the
same case as before. If the fiscal authority com-
mits to a D path, then the only equilibrium
choice for private agents is given by equation
(15). If instead the general public moves first,
then the fiscal authority must adjust D to satisfy
equation (15). In this latter case, once again we
have the possibility of sunspot equilibria.
Before closing, we should ask the question:
Are these endogenous money cases examples of
strong-form or weak-form FT? On one level they
appear to satisfy the criteria for strong-form FT
in that the fiscal authority is acting in a dominant
fashion, as is the central bank since it chooses
its goal (for example, an interest rate peg)
regardless of fiscal concerns. But at a deeper
level, they are really examples of weak-form FT.
The monetary authority is not truly dominant
because money supply and seignorage are
endogenous. That is, if the fiscal authority
chooses a different fiscal stance (D), then the
monetary authority must change the money sup-
ply to ensure the interest rate target is still satis-
fied. The monetary authority moves last and, in
essence, is the one that always blinks, as occurs
under weak-form FT. Perhaps more importantly,
it is only an example of weak-form FT since the
fiscal authority only affects the price level by
altering the endogenous supply of money. 
IV. Conclusion
This article began with the observation that the
implications of weak-form FT on monetary pol-
icy are not controversial. If the central bank is
passive and the fiscal authority is dominant,
then fiscal policy has an enormous influence
on the price level. But this traditional form of
the FT is also consistent with Friedman’s dic-
tum, since fiscal policy affects prices and infla-
tion only through its effect on money.
Recently a much stronger version of this the-
ory has been presented. There are two possibil-
ities in the more recent versions of the fiscal
theory of the price level: (1) strong-form FT, in
which fiscal policy affects the price level inde-
pendent of the money supply process, and (2)
the case of interest rate targeting, in which the
money supply is endogenous. 
The strong-form FT, in which both the fiscal
and monetary authorities move first (neither
blinks), relies on large elasticities and thus is lit-
tle more than an intellectual curiosity. It is diffi-
cult to take these examples too seriously.
As for interest rate targeting, our conclusion
is more circumspect. This is actually not strong-
form FT because movements in prices are still
governed by movements in money. 
This does not imply, however, that the FT
has no important implications for monetary
policy. There is a long line of research suggest-
ing that interest rate targeting is indeed benefi-
cial. A classic criticism of such a policy, though,
is that the endogeneity of the money supply
makes the price level unstable. In models with
nominal rigidities, this also makes output unsta-
ble. FT advocates argue that this is not the case:
If the fiscal authority commits to a budgetary
path, then the general public must adjust its
behavior to ensure equilibrium, and this restric-
tion pins down the price level. If we accept
such an argument, then the case for interest rate
targeting is greatly strengthened. The govern-
ment’s budget greatly reduces these sunspot
equilibria—only changes in D are sunspot equi-
libria in the sense that they can cause a one-
time jump in the price level. But if the more
appropriate way to view this game of chicken is
to assume that the fiscal authority always moves
last, then interest rate targeting remains prob-
lematic because it can result in instability.
  11 The only difference between the steady-state and the general-
equilibrium models is that, in the latter, the timing assumption (the bond
market opens at the end of the period) transforms the nominal indeterminacy
in the steady-state model into a real indeterminacy (of real balances) in the
general-equilibrium model.
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Appendix A
This appendix demonstrates that if G   1, then
hyperdeflations do not satisfy the household’s
transversality condition. The transversality con-
dition is given by
(A1) lim βtmt = 0.
t →∞
This requires that real balances grow at a
rate less than 1/β. Rewriting equation (9), we
have
(A2) mt +1=  (m
–ε
t +1 + 1)  β mt.
Since real balances are exploding along a
hyperdeflation, the bracketed term in equation
(A2) is growing. Since G   1, this term will
eventually exceed one. Therefore, real balances
will grow at a rate exceeding 1/β and will vio-
late the transversality condition. 
Appendix B
This appendix provides details of the case with
nonseparable preferences (section II). From
equation (7), the fundamental equation of the
model is given by 
(B1)
G
β mtU c(mt ) = mt + 1[Uc(mt + 1) + Um(mt + 1)].
Expressing mt + 1 as a function of mt, mt + 1 =
g(mt), and then totally differentiating equation
(B1), yields




where η   0 is the interest elasticity of money
demand. A necessary and sufficient condition
for 0   g′(mss)   1 (so that we have a map-
ping as in figure 3), is for (1 + mUcm/Uc)   0.
This is just the condition in equation (12). 
There are, of course, other possibilities. If 
(1 + mUcm/Uc)   0, then there are two cases. If
η is sufficiently small, 
(B3) η   1 + R  1 + mUcm/Uc ,
then g′(mss)   0. This tends to produce oscilla-
tory behavior. Remarkably, Matsuyama (1991)
demonstrates that if g′(mss) is sufficiently nega-
tive, then there are chaotic dynamics. 
In the more likely case that 
(B4) η   1 + R  1 + mUcm/Uc ,
then g′(mss)   1, and we are back to a model
similar to that in figure 1 or figure 2.
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